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Abstract: We use insights from epidemiology, namely the SIR model, to study how agents
infect each other with “investment ideas.” Once an investment idea “goes viral,” equilibrium
prices exhibit the typical “fever peak,” which is characteristic for speculative excesses as
described, e.g., in Kindleberger (2000). Using our model, we identify a time line of symptoms
that indicate whether a boom is in its early or later stages. Regarding the market’s top, we
find that prices start to decline while the number of infected agents, who buy the asset, is
still rising. Moreover, the presence of fully rational agents (i) accelerates booms (ii) lowers
peak prices and (iii) produces broad, drawn-out, market tops.
Keywords: Thought Viruses, Bounded Rationality, Rational Expectations
JEL: D5, D52, E03, E32, E62
“More and more people realized the misconception on which the boom rested even as they
continued to play the game.” Soros (1994), p. 57.
1 Introduction
Market practitioners frequently argue that they observe asset prices, which are “far away”
from “fundamentals.”2 They also suggest that many such deviations come in the form of
boom-bust cycles, which are hard to reconcile with traditional asset pricing models. The
current paper presents a simple epidemiological model where investors “infect” each other
with their investment ideas. The model generates market prices that are in line with the
1I thank Dominik Grafenhofer and Carl Christian von Weizsa¨cker for helpful and encouraging discussions.
This version: 30.12.2018.
2Soros (1994), pp. 27-141, provides a detailed argument and a large collection of case studies. See also
the “Mr. Market” parable in Graham (1973), pp. 188-213, or Fisher (2003), pp. 266-275. Kindleberger
(2000) presents a historical account of such boom and bust episodes.
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practitioners’ boom and bust observation. In turn, we use the model to perform comparative
statics, and to establish a time-line of events that lead and lag market tops.
To model the infectious spread of investment ideas, we borrow the standard SIR model
from the literature on epidemiology.3 The SIR framework has been used successfully to model
the spread of infectious diseases, computer viruses, chain letters, and religions. In the current
setting it governs the rate with which agents adopt and discard their views on certain assets.
The SIR model’s key prediction, namely that the mass of infected agents is hump-shaped,
generates the boom-bust sequence in stock prices that practitioners emphasize.
We distinguish two main scenarios. First, we study a setting where susceptible investors
buy the asset once infected, and sell once cured. Second, we study a setting where cured
agents form rational expectations, which can induce them to hold overpriced assets in order
to wait for further appreciation. Such rational expectations on the part of cured agents
make prices (i) rise faster (ii) peak earlier and (iii) generate broad, drawn-out, market tops.
Without rational agents, prices rise at a slower pace, but they reach a higher maximum.
Finally, we find that price peaks lead the peak in infected agents across both scenarios. Put
differently, prices go into decline while sentiment is still improving.
Having derived these properties, we compare the observable parts of our predictions to
a few prominent cases of boom and bust. Using search queries from Google as a proxy for
the mass of infected agents, we find that both, search queries and the corresponding asset’s
price, show the fever curve pattern that the current model suggests. Moreover, prices indeed
tend to peak before the mass of infected agents does. Finally, slow moving boom-bust cycles,
where cured agents have time to form rational expectations, have broad tops.
Literature: Dawkins (1995) suggests that humans are susceptible to “Viruses of the
mind.” Such viruses can come in the form of religions or political believes, which spread in
a contagious manner.4
Instead of adopting religions, our agents believe in certain investment ideas, valuation
3Kermack and McKendrick (1927) present the mainstream SIR specification used here.
Dietz and Heesterbeek (2002) review the historical literature on modelling epidemics dating back to
Daniel Bernoulli’s original manuscript, which was first circulated in 1760.
4In different contexts, Harris (1995) and Kahneman (2012) discuss how agents adopt and discard different,
not necessarily correct, approaches to decision making. See also von Weizsa¨cker (1971), who proposes a model
of changing tastes.
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techniques, or future technological developments. Moreover, our agents work as financial
missionaries when they share their investment tips with colleagues, friends, and neighbors.
The analogy to an infectious process is even more straight forward in specific episodes such
as the “gold fever” epidemic, where a susceptible east-coast population was infected by the
first prospectors who returned from California.
Shive (2010) finds that the SIR specification can explain the clustering of agents’ real es-
tate investments. Feng and Seasholes (2004), Hong et al. (2004, 2005), Ivkovic and Weisbrenner
(2007), and Brown et al. (2008) find similar evidence suggesting that neighbors emulate each
other’s investment choices.5 Ash (1955) shows that a considerable fraction of people follow
other’s choices even when they know that these choices are wrong.
Shiller (2017) suggests that the SIR specification helps to study the spread of economic
“narratives,” such as the idea of the “Laffer curve.” In our model, such narratives come in
the form of the “BRICS” countries, asian tigers, “.com” stocks, securitized mortgage debt,
or “crypto currencies.” Related, Daley and Kendall (1964, 1965) have sparked a literature,
e.g., Moreno et al. (2004), that uses epidemiological models to study the spread rumors.
Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992) provide
Bayesian frameworks of herd behavior, which can be used to generate boom-bust sequences
in asset prices within a traditional rational expectation framework. In this interpretation,
the current SIR specification studies how certain pieces of Bayesian information permeate a
given population of investors. Regarding rationality, Kindleberger (2000), p. 15-16, points
out that speculative manias are concentrated in assets which are hard to understand, such
as options, futures, tulip seeds during winter, real estate and land, goods manufactured for
export markets, and more generally foreign exchange. Recent episodes like the “.com” crash,
the US housing crisis with its complex mortgage backed securities, and the rise and fall in
crypto-currencies clearly fit this description.
Our model coexists with a large number of alternative theories of boom and bust. First,
any Walrasian model, which features multiple equilibria, can explain abrupt changes in
price simply as a move from one equilibrium to another. Equilibrium models of portfolio
insurance, flights to quality, rational herding, informational avalanches, and game theoretic
5Kindleberger (2000), p. 15, notes that “there is nothing so disturbing to one’s well-being and judgement
as to see a friend get rich.”
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formulations, such as models of exchange rate crises, can generate drastic price changes
within a rational expectations (RE) frame. One key difference between theses RE models
and the present one is the speed of adjustment. Rational agents ensure that markets reprice,
more or less, immediately. That is, moving from one equilibrium to another produces an
instantaneous change in price. The current model generates smooth booms and smooth
busts, which are in line with the observation that many boom bust phenomena unfold over
time frames ranging from several month to decades.6
Section introduces the model. Section 3 considers the impact of rational expectations.
Section 4 compares our theoretical results to a number of historic boom-bust episodes. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We recall the SIR model,7 and add the asset market later. The SIR model studies how a
disease spreads among a mass N of agents. These agents belong to three groups. First, there
is a group of susceptible agents S. Second, there is a group of infected agents I. Finally,
there are recovered agents R. When infected agents meet susceptible agents, they transmit
the virus at rate β. Infected agents recover at rate γ. Finally, we work with continuous time
t, such that the epidemic is characterized by a first-order differential equation:
S˙ = −βIS, (1)
I˙ = βIS − γI, (2)
R˙ = γI, (3)
N = S + I +R, N = N1 +N2 +N3. (4)
Equation (1) describes how susceptible agents get infected. Equation (2) tracks the mass
of infected agents: it adds newly infected and subtracts recovered agents. Equation (3)
accounts for cured agents. Finally, (4) ensures that the overall population remains constant
over time; Starting in t = 0 we have N1 susceptible agents, N2 infected agents, N3 recovered
agents, and a total population N .
6Japanese real estate saw steep appreciation for 30 years before it reached its 1989-1991 peak. In turn,
prices declined for roughly 25 years.
7See e.g., Hirsch et al. (2003), pp. 235-239.
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Combining (1)-(4) we note:
Lemma 1. Given initial conditions {N1, N2, N3}, Ni > 0, i = 1, 2, 3, the SIR model has
one stable steady state, {N − R∞, 0, R∞}, where R∞ = −
γ
β
ln(N − R∞) + CR, and CR =
N3 +
γ
β
ln(N1).
Proof. Combining (1) with (2), we can integrate
I = −S +
γ
β
ln(S) + CI , CI = N1 +N2 −
γ
β
ln(N1). (5)
Likewise (1) and (3) yield
R = −
γ
β
ln(S) + CR, CR = N3 +
γ
β
ln(N1). (6)
From (3), we see that I = 0 in steady state. Combining I = 0 with (5), (6) and (4),
we have S∞ = N − R∞ and R∞ = −
γ
β
ln(N − R∞) + CR, where the last equation defines a
unique R∞.
The steady state of Lemma 1 is reached via a transition path, along which susceptible
agents become infected, and infected agents get cured. This transition path exhibits a peak
in infected agents:
Lemma 2. If N1 >
β
γ
, then there exists a point in time t∗I > 0, where the mass of infected
agents I peaks.
Proof. To prove that there exists a unique peak in infected agents in a period t∗I , we recall
(5):
I = −S +
γ
β
ln(S) + CI , CI = N1 +N2 −
γ
β
ln(N1). (7)
Taking derivatives yields
dI
dS
= −1 +
γ
β
1
S
= 0, (8)
and
d2I
dS2
= −
γ
β
1
S2
< 0. (9)
Hence, there exists a global infection maximum at S∗ = γ
β
, where I∗ = −γ
β
+ γ
β
ln( γ
β
)− CS.
To relate our peak in infected agents to a period in time, we note that equation (1) ensures
that S˙ < 0 at all points in time, such that the condition S(t) = S∗ = γ
β
can be inverted
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t∗I = S
−1( γ
β
). That is, the mass of infected agents peaks in time t∗I , and at this point in time,
we have dI/dt = 0 and d2I/dt2 < 0.
To prove Lemma 2, it was convenient to express the mass of infected agents as a function
I(S). To study how this peak in infected agents relates to stock prices, it will be necessary to
account for the fact that different cohorts of infected agents buy and sell at different prices.
To do so, we denote cohorts cv of agents by the (vintage) period t = v, where they were first
infected:
cv = βIvSv. (10)
Taking into account that infected agents get cured at rate γ, and summing over all infected
cohorts, yields the mass of infected agents in period t:
I = β
∫ t
0
IvSve
−γ(t−v)dv. (11)
Using (11), the condition for t∗I from Lemma 2 can be written as:
dI
dt
= βI(t)S(t)− βγ
∫ t
0
IvSve
−γ(t−v)dv = 0. (12)
Regarding (12) we note that inserting (11) brings us back to (2). Expression (12) will,
however, be useful once we have to track dated asset purchases and sales of different cohorts.
2.1 Market
We assume that susceptible agents hold one unit of currency each. When agents get infected,
they buy the asset. Once cured, agents sell their position. Regarding the asset market, we
assume that there is an exogenously given (excess) supply function:
X = φ(P ), φ′() > 0, φ(P0) = 0, (13)
which interacts with the demand of infected agents. Equation (13) may be interpreted as
the supply of “.com” stocks, tulips, crypto currencies, flats, which come to the market,
respectively, via new IPOs, professional florists, bitcoin farms, or the incumbent population
in an in-fashion residential area.
To compute infected agents’ demand, we recall (1)-(2), and note that a cohort cv =
βI(v)S(v) of agents, who were infected in period t = v, depreciates exponentially such that
the cohort’s period t size is:
cv(t) = βI(v)S(v)e
−γ(t−v). (14)
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Regarding the period t asset holdings, of all infected cohorts v, we have:8
XI = β
∫ t
0
IvSv
P (v)
e−γ(t−v)dv. (15)
where 1
P (v)
is the number of shares that infected agents buy in period t = v, when they invest
their one unit of currency into the speculative asset. The variable XI denotes the number
of shares, held by all cohorts of infected agents, in period t.
Combining asset supply (13) with demand (15), the equilibrium price is:
φ(P ) = β
∫ t
0
IvSv
P (v)
e−γ(t−v)dv ⇔ P = φ−1
(
β
∫ t
0
IvSv
P (v)
e−γ(t−v)dv
)
. (16)
Evaluation of (16) yields:
Proposition 1. The asset’s price peaks in period t∗p, where t
∗
p < t
∗
I . The long-run, steady
state, price is P0.
Proof. The asset price peaks when P˙ = 1
φ′(XI )
dXI
dt
= 0. From (15) it follows that this
condition for t∗p can be written as
dXI
dt
= β
I(t)S(t)
P (t)
− βγ
∫ t
0
IvSv
P (v)
e−γ(t−v)dv = 0. (17)
Regarding the derivative dXI
dt
, we first note that limt→0
dXI
dt
> 0. That is, the price is
increasing at t = 0. Moreover, we recall (15) and note that limt→∞XI = 0
9, i.e., in the long
run steady state, the demand of infected speculators is zero. Hence, the long run price is
P0 = φ
−1(0).
Unique peak price: We have seen that, starting with a price P0, the price is first increasing
in time and then eventually reverts to P0 in the long-run. Hence, there must be at least one
t∗P , where the price peaks. This period is implicitly defined by condition (17). To show that
the peak is unique, we study the second-order condition:
d2XI
dt2
= −
1
P
S¨ −
1
P 2
P˙ S˙ − βγ
[
β
I(t)S(t)
P (t)
− βγ
∫ t
0
IvSv
P (v)
e−γ(t−v)dv
]
(18)
=|P˙=0,(17) −
1
P
S¨ < 0. (19)
To interpret (19), we recall S¨|(1) = −β(I˙S + IS˙) and rearrange it using (2), such that:
S¨
S˙
1
β
= −I + S −
γ
β
(20)
8We suppress the holdings of agents N2, who are infected in t = 0. Adding these holdings, inflates
notation and does not change the results. Alternatively, we may assume that N2 is small.
9To see this note that βγ
∫ t
0
IvSv
P (v) e
−γ(t−v)dv < γ I
P0
and recall that limt→∞ I = 0.
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For the terms in (20), we note that (1) ensures 1
S˙
< 0, and from Lemma 2 we know S− γ
β
< 0
for all t > t∗I . If the mass of susceptible agents is sufficiently large,
10 at the beginning of
time, S¨ starts out negative, but before time t∗I is reached, where S =
γ
β
, it will turn positive,
and stay positive ever after. During the period where S¨ > 0, we may have price peaks, but
cannot have minima. Once, S¨ < 0 we may have minima, but no maxima. That is, in t = 0,
prices start to increase away from the starting level P0. This price increase first accelerates
until the second derivative changes signs, and the price increase decelerates until a peak is
reached. After the peak, prices start to decline.
Finally, it remains to show that t∗p < t
∗
I . To do so we compare the condition (17), for the
period where the price peaks, with the condition for t∗I , where the number of infected agents
peaks. The mass of infected agents peaks when:
dI
dt
= βI(t)S(t)− βγ
∫ t
0
IvSve
−γ(t−v)dv = 0. (21)
Multiplying (17), the condition for the period where the price peaks, with P (t), yields
dXI
dt
P (t) = βI(t)S(t)− βγ
∫ t
0
IvSvP (t)
P (v)
e−γ(t−v)dv = 0. (22)
The difference between (21) and (22) is the term P (t)
P (v)
. Regarding this term, we note that,
as long as the price is increasing between time 0 and t, we have P (t)
P (v)
> 1 for all v < t.
Accordingly, for any arbitrary period of time t, for which the price is increasing, we have
dI
dt
> dXI
dt
P (t). Hence, when the price peaks at t∗p, we have
dXI
dt
P (t∗p) = 0 and
dI
dt
> 0. That
is, when the price peaks, the mass of infected agents is still increasing in time.
Put differently, early buyers have amassed large wealth, and when they start to sell, they
have a greater weight in the market than those agents who buy in late with their one unit
of currency.
2.2 Depressions
In the current model we have discussed how investors, who infect each other with euphoria,
can bid up prices. The same argument works in reverse when depression spreads. That
is, we may model an infected agent as someone who adopts the view that stocks or real
10As we have seen in Lemma 2 we need N1 >
γ
β
for a peak in I to exist. Moreover, we need only a small
number of initially infected agents to start an epidemic, i.e., we can pick an arbitrarily small number N2 for
the number of initially infected agents.
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estate prices will never appreciate again. In that case, the same mechanism works in reverse,
creating a U-shaped price pattern. Regarding this depression, we can once again show that
asset prices bottom before the selling sentiment does.
3 Rational Expectations
At the top of the market there is hesitation, as new recruits to speculation are balanced by
insiders who withdraw. Kindleberger (2000) p. 17
So far we have assumed that agents simply close their position once they recover from
their false investment thesis. Put differently, when agents understood that they owned an
over valued asset, they sold. Another way to model recovering agents is to assume that they
fully understand the model that they operate in.
When cured agents know the entire model, they can find themselves in two different
situations. First, the agent gets cured after the price has peaked. In this scenario it is
clearly rational to sell immediately. Second, the agent gets cured while the market price
is still increasing. In this second scenario, cured agents will keep the asset for as long as
it appreciates. To do so, they have to compute the point in time when the market peaks.
To find this point, they must compute the asset holdings of all other agents who are also
waiting to exit at the top. Second, they must know the asset holdings of those who are
currently infected, but will get cured before the price peaks. Finally, the mass of susceptible
investors who will buy in the future is important, since these investors provide the liquidity
that rational sellers need to exit their positions.
Two points in time are thus of particular importance. First, there is the point in time
t1, where the price peaks, and rational agents start to sell to newly infected buyers. At t1
the sum of future net buying of newly infected agents, must be sufficient to absorb all the
holdings that rational agents, who were waiting for the price to peak, have accumulated up
until t1. To calculate the net buying of newly infected agents, we have to identify the point
in time t2 where the buying of newly infected agents is exactly offset by the selling of newly
cured agents. Time t2 is the point where the last rational agent, who was waiting for the
market top, must have sold out. After t2, buying of newly infected agents falls short of the
selling of newly cured agents and prices decline.
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We start with t2, the point in time where the buying of newly infected agents is exactly
offset by the selling of newly cured agents:
dXI
dt
= β
I(t)S(t)
P (t)
− βγ
∫ t
0
IvSv
P (v)
e−γ(t−v)dv = 0. (23)
This condition is the same as (17) except for the price history, i.e., the values P (v) are
different since cured agents did not sell immediately.11
Period t1, is the period when rational agents start to sell:
∫ t1
0
(
1− e−γ(t1−v)
)
β
IvSv
P (v)
dv = β
∫ t2
t1
IvSv
P (v)
e−γ(t2−v)dv = 0. (24)
The RHS of (24) describes the net buying of newly infected agents between t1 and t2. This
must be equal/sufficient to absorb the assets that cured agents accumulated (LHS) between
t = 0 and t1 with the motive to sell at the market top. Put differently, (24) ensures that the
entire selling of cured agents can be absorbed through the buying of newly infected agents.
And once period t2 is reached, the holdings of cured agents, who waited for the top, have
been passed on completely to newly infected agents. Finally, the price at which rational
agents sell is:
P ∗ = φ−1
(∫ t1
0
β
IvSv
P (v)
dt
)
. (25)
Where (25) reflects that there is no selling before time t1 is reached. Taking (23)-(25)
together we have:
Proposition 2. (Broad-Peak-Theorem): The market price remains constant at its peaks P ∗
as long as t ∈ [t1, t2].
Proposition 2 relies on the assumption that cured agents know the correct model and
all its coefficients. Moreover, they are able to solve the model. Proposition 2 should thus
be interpreted as a reference point, which we can use as a comparison for the “fever peak”
which we derived in Proposition 1. The fever peak relied on the assumption that recovered
agents cannot fully understand the model, and thus they cannot correctly anticipate the top.
Hence, they simply close their position. Put differently, these agents just discard the wrong
thesis they used to buy the asset, but they do not replace this thesis with a new thesis, which
tells them, e.g., that the price may appreciate further. To close our comparison of these two
11Period t2 therefore does not coincide with t
∗
P .
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cases, we make three remarks. Whenever necessary, we denote variables that correspond to
the case where cured agents simply sell by a subscript M. Cases where cured agents form
rational expectations are denoted by RE. We begin by noting that the price increase is more
rapid when cured agents from rational expectations:
Remark 1. For the period where t ∈ (0, t1] we have PM < PRE.
Proof. In both scenarios, the buying is governed by the same infection process. The sce-
narios differ regarding selling. In the RE setting, where cured agents form rational expec-
tations, there is no selling during the period t ∈ [0, t1]. Asset holdings, and prices, are thus
always higher in the RE setting than in setting M where agents sell immediately after being
cured.
Remark 2. The peak price is lower under rational expectations P ∗RE < P
∗
M .
Proof. Let us first recall that all rational agents have sold out, by the time that t2 is reached.
Hence, the mass of infected agents who hold the speculative asset is the same in t2 across both
scenarios RE and M. To proof our remark by contradiction, we now assume that PM < PRE
for all t ∈ [0, t2). Under this assumption period t2 asset holdings are:
XRE = β
∫ t2
0
IvSv
PRE(v)
e−γ(t−v)dv < β
∫ t2
0
IvSv
PM(v)
e−γ(t−v)dv = XM . (26)
This however means that P (XRE) < P (XM), and contradicts our assumption PM < PRE for
all t ∈ [0, t2). Hence, the price PM must exceed P
∗
RE before t2 is reached.
Remark 3. t1 < t
∗
P < t2 < t
∗
I .
Proof. t1 < t
∗
P : The price PRE peaks in period t1 and remains at this level until t2 is reached.
To see that t1 < t
∗
P , we recall Remark 1, i.e., that PRE > PM for all t ∈ (0, t1]. At the same
time, Remark 2 shows that PM must exceed PRE before t2 is reached. Hence, the date t
∗
P ,
where PM peaks, must be such that t1 < t
∗
P .
t2 < t
∗
I follows immediately from the same argument given in the proof of Proposition 2,
which relies on the comparison of equations (21) and (22). That is, in period t2, all newly
cured agents bought at prices less or equal P ∗RE . Thus, given that their one Dollar investment
appreciated, they have a higher monetary weight than the newly infected buyers. Hence, at
t2, the mass of infected agents must still be increasing to absorb the selling. An alternative
way, to observe the same thing, is to show that the price is already in decline at t∗I .
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Inequality t∗P < t2: We have shown in Remark 2 that PM must exceed P
∗
RE before t2.
Does the peak in PM also occur before t2? If PM > PRE then XM > XRE . taking derivatives,
at t2, yields:
0 =
IS
PRE
− γ
∫ t2
0
IvSv
PRE(v)
e−γ(t−v)dv T IS
PM
− γ
∫ t2
0
IvSv
PM(v)
e−γ(t−v)dv. (27)
For t2 < t
∗
P , we must have PM > PRE in t2 This means that
IS
PM
< IS
PRE
since P =
P (γ
∫ t2
0
IvSv
PRE(v)
e−γ(t−v)dv), we also know that γ
∫ t2
0
IvSv
PRE(v)
e−γ(t−v)dv < γ
∫ t2
0
IvSv
PM (v)
e−γ(t−v)dv.
Rearranging (27) thus gives:
IS
( 1
PRE
−
1
PM
)
−
(
γ
∫ t2
0
IvSv
PRE(v)
e−γ(t−v)dv − γ
∫ t2
0
IvSv
PM(v)
e−γ(t−v)dv
)
> 0 (28)
Hence, dXM
dt
(t2) < 0, i.e., the price PM is in decline at t2, and its peak must have occurred
earlier. That is, t∗P < t2.
4 Examples
In this section, we use data from Google Ngrams and Goolde trends to study some of
our predictions. Across cases, there is strong support for the epidemiological fever-peak.
The search queries/literature mentions for particular assets show a pronounced hump-shape
pattern, which coincides with a hump shaped pattern in these assets’ prices. Moreover, in
line with our model’s prediction, prices peak earlier than search queries/literature mentions.
Bitcoin: Using Google trends, we have the search history for the term “Bitcoin.” Bitcoin
search peaked in the period between December 17th and 23rd at 100. Before, Bitcoin
search was at a level of 3 between 2013 and April 2017. Dollar prices for Bitcoin went
from 1200 in April 2017 to their 19.587 peak on 16th of December 2018. While search for
Bitcoin continued to rise sharply between December 17th and 23rd, prices dropped to around
1400012 on December 23, and have continued to decline alongside with search queries, to 3800
respectively 10 in December 2018.
The “.com” boom: Using Google Ngrams data for the period 1980-2008, we find that the
frequency with which the terms “Nasdaq,” “MSFT” and “AMZN” are mentioned follow the
hump-shaped pattern suggested by the SIR model. This pattern extends to the corresponding
prices. Regarding the time line of peaks, we note that mentions of the “Nasdaq” peaked
12Prices are taken from Yahoo Finance. December 23rd highs and lows were roughly 15000 and 13000.
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in 2001, while the Nasdaq composite index peaked in March 2000. The MSFT (Microsoft)
stock peaked in late 1999, mentions of the “MSFT” ticker symbol peaked in 2004. Mentions
of the AMZN (Amazon) ticker peaked in 2002 while the stock peaked in late 1999. Mentions
of “new economy” and “software” both peaked in 2002.
Japanese Nikkei index: Using Google Ngrams (case insensitive), we view the term “Made
in Japan” as a proxy for the sentiment towards the Japanese Nikkei industrial index. The
Nikkei peak in 1989 leads the “Made in Japan” peak between 1990-1994.
5 Conclusion
We model booms and busts in asset prices as an epidemic process: agents infect each other
with their investment ideas, valuation techniques, or believes in future technological devel-
opments. To model how such ideas permeate a large population of susceptible investors we
have used the classic SIR specification from the literature on epidemiology.
Our model generates sentiment driven booms-bust cycles, which market practitioners
emphasize. In addition to producing such price swings, our model can be used to perform
comparative statics. In particular, we find that rational agents (i) accelerate booms (ii)
lower peak prices and (iii) make for broad, drawn-out, market tops. Finally, regardless of
whether cured agents are rational or not, prices peak before sentiment, i.e. the mass of
infected agents, does.
Google data indicate that interest in speculative assets indeed exhibits boom-bust pat-
terns akin to the SIR model’s infection peak. Moreover, the peak in price tends to precede
the peak in queries. The “Bitcoin” boom with its sharp peak was more in line with our
scenario, where cured agents are best advised to sell quickly. Deeper markets had broader
peaks, which give well informed investors more time to trade with late stage optimists.
13
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